#3 Sandhya A.S., "Agents of migration: Institutional embeddedness of labour brokerage in Nepal" (2026)

Show notes

Agents of Migration: Institutional Embeddedness of Labour Brokerage in Nepal

https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-95-8735-3

International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy (IMPRS-SPCE)

https://imprs.mpifg.de/

German Research Foundation (DFG)

https://www.dfg.de/en/

Cross Border Labor Markets: transnational market makers, infrastructures, institutions (RTG 2951)

https://rtg2951.de/

Foreign Employment Board (Nepal)

https://feb.gov.np/

Bielefeld University

https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/

Show transcript

00:00:00: (automatically generated) And one of the most important practical implications is that if precarities indeed produce systemically, we cannot address it simply by identifying and punishing individual agents.

00:00:12: That does not mean that agents should be held accountable for their actions but focusing only on individual bad actors can obscure the broader structures that create conditions under which exploitation becomes possible.

00:00:27: So for example, migration agents operate within a system there are shaped bilateral agreements state regulations international organizations The nature of demand itself to employer foreign labour market dynamics power asymmetries information asymmetry.

00:00:43: also more importantly perhaps economic pressures.

00:00:46: migrant faces compels them to comply with these standards.

00:00:51: So a lot of factors enable the work.

00:01:06: You're listening to the Bielefeld Anthro Book Podcast, featuring new and classic books in anthropology with authors who are based at Bielefeld University or guest scholars.

00:01:20: I am Lana Emani a student of Sociology and producer of this podcast.

00:01:29: Our guest

00:01:30: Sandhya A.S. is an economic sociologist studying labour migration.

00:01:35: She is currently a postdoc in the research training group Cross Border Labor Markets, transnational market makers infrastructures institutions which are funded by German Research Foundation DFG.

00:01:51: She received her PhD within the International Max Planck Research School of Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, and finds their work engaging with both sociology-and social anthropological traditions.

00:02:08: Our host, Mai Chin Nguyen is a first year doctoral researcher in the same research training group.

00:02:16: Her research interests lie at the intersection of international education, migration aspirations and labor market outcomes with a current focus on Vietnamese students in Japan's English top programs.

00:02:32: Thank you for inviting us.

00:02:33: I'm Chi and as introduced before, I am joined today by Sandhya author of the new book Agents Of Migration Institutional Embeddedness Of Labour Brokwidge In Nepal Published By Springer Nature.

00:02:45: Sandh ya it's wonderful to have you here in congratulations on The New Book.

00:02:48: thank You so much Chi.

00:02:50: Now, before we dive into our conversation I'd like to give our listeners a short summary of the book for those who haven't had the chance to read it yet.

00:02:58: So Sandhya's new book Agents Of Migration challenges how we explain one of the most persistent phenomena of contemporary labor migration.

00:03:07: why do migration agents or brokers not only survive but thrive even as social networks grow stronger?

00:03:15: Or even estates try to regulate and replace them?

00:03:18: Rather than seeing this as an organic outcome of neoliberal capitalism or blaming brokers themselves for migrant precarity, Sandhya argues that we need to look at how.

00:03:28: brokerage is an institutionally constructed and contested market one actively organized by states like Nepal.

00:03:42: The book examines how this market was made, how its practices became normalized and how it continuously fights for social legitimacy revealing that the real story of migration brokerage is not about individual middlemen exploiting vulnerable workers but about how states markets society together shape conditions under which migrants move.

00:04:03: Now, with that framing in place I'd love to start with how this project came about for you Sandhya.

00:04:09: What first drew you into the project?

00:04:11: was there a particular empirical gap?

00:04:13: A puzzle or something unexpected?

00:04:15: you came across and made your want to dig deeper and eventually write this monograph?

00:04:19: Yeah!

00:04:20: This project came out of my PhD work.

00:04:22: so like any other doctoral researcher...I had a tentative theoretical gap in mind, which was driven by a pertinent question that despite such advancements and technology communication And despite the establishment of social networks That usually help rich information deficit brokerage still lingers.

00:04:48: So my question really is why this case?

00:04:51: when I went to Kathmandu Nepal in late twenty nineteen and early twenty-twenty.

00:04:57: I was expecting to find answers along the lines of what kind of functions do brokers perform?

00:05:04: Perhaps there were certain things they did for migrant workers that could not be replaced by technology, perhaps they navigated bureaucratic hurdles in very specific ways but then i found something really unexpected.

00:05:20: Brokers at Nepal didn't just persist because They did something special for the migrants or for the employers abroad, but they existed because they were made structurally indispensable by state.

00:05:34: The book opens with an interview with a migrant worker named Nilesh.

00:05:41: This was a worker who has been abroad two to three times before.

00:05:45: He's always used services of a broker.

00:05:48: So that is quite common to have, use broker services and there was common among his peers as well.

00:05:55: So he did exactly that.

00:05:57: but for his third employment in Dubai He thought he'll do something differently .He thought he will save money.

00:06:04: Recruitment fee can be quite high For migrant workers.

00:06:07: so he saw why not this time?

00:06:09: I find job on my own.

00:06:11: Why Do i need a broker?

00:06:12: Already Have contacts!

00:06:18: The employer likes him, he had an established rapport with them.

00:06:22: so it was quite easy.

00:06:24: He arranged all his documentation on its own... ...he has the paper that needs to fly out of Nepal.

00:06:31: So he comes from Nepal-Katmandu International Airport and from there he decides go a certain date.

00:06:38: But airport authorities prevent him doing this.

00:06:42: The airport authorities tell him without a specific document called Demand Letter which you can only obtain from a recruitment agency, You Can't Fly Out For Work Abroad.

00:06:53: So this conversation and further investigation along the line showed me that low-skilled migrant workers in Nepal are in fact unable to migrate for work abroad without the services of Migrant Recruitment Agency.

00:07:06: The book proceeds to show why it is really the case.

00:07:10: Thank you very much.

00:07:11: That story about Nilesh and the structural indispensability of migrant agents actually really is very central to the argument for this book, but before we get into that I would like maybe set a bit of scene in Nepal's context with our listeners.

00:07:30: so what was it like on the ground?

00:07:32: For your study can you paint a picture of what the world of migration brokerage looks like in Nepal or Kathmandu?

00:07:39: specifically you did your field work.

00:07:41: One of the things that struck me most was just how pervasive brokerage really is in Nepal, coming to this field as an outsider I found it fascinating because there isn't really any equivalent or something like this from where i come from which is India.

00:07:57: Brokerage isn't simply and intermediary service people use time-to-time.

00:08:02: It's really woven into migration process itself And that I've found superfascinating.

00:08:09: The first place where I encountered this was at the airport itself.

00:08:13: So there's a separate departure gate for migrant workers in Nepal, something that i've never seen before.

00:08:19: so even there you immediately see that labour migration is treated as a distinct category of mobility.

00:08:25: There are separate entry points and they're said only with appropriate overseas work permit can go abroad And You Can Take That Particular Pathway.

00:08:33: It Signals To Me That This Is not just an individual travel decision, it is a highly organized system.

00:08:41: The Arrival Hall was another example of how revealing this phenomena is.

00:08:47: families and friends you see them gathering in large numbers to welcome the returning migrants And these arrivals are often they do have very performative quality for them.

00:08:59: so Returning Migrants Are Often Arriving In Very Well Dressed Way They Have.

00:09:05: They're wearing new clothes, they are carrying large gifts.

00:09:08: Often electronic items like big LED televisions stereo sets or other kinds of electronics often still in their original packaging so people can see them.

00:09:18: So these are moments which are deeply emotional reunions but there also public performances on what migration made possible for them.

00:09:27: They visibly communicate achievement sacrifice and social mobility through these arrivals.

00:09:33: That was quite interesting as well.

00:09:35: Another woman that stayed with me, was visiting a place called Manpower Bazaar which is essentially marketplace of recruitment agencies in Nepal.

00:09:44: There I saw large numbers of prospective migrants just in waiting sometimes for days and weeks to hear back from recruitment agents on their jobs abroad.

00:09:55: This is a very striking image and I couldn't really capture it well in a photograph but the strikingness comes from contrast created by pace of city which was fast like any other South Asian City.

00:10:08: There's traffic, there is chaos.

00:10:09: It's also a very popular pilgrimage site.

00:10:12: so this way famous temple there.

00:10:14: So lot of tourists come from different parts of South Asia.

00:10:17: it's very crowded and chaotic but then you see the migrant workers temporarily immobilized.

00:10:23: They're just standing they are fiddling with their phones looking around doing absolutely nothing but stand in public places.

00:10:31: This creates a very stark contrast visually and I found it quite interesting.

00:10:36: they're standing there in anticipation of future mobility completely immobilized.

00:10:41: so this experience is where for me, it crystallised what brokerage means ethnographically.

00:10:48: Brokers don't simply facilitate migration, they structure the temporalities of migration.

00:10:53: They determine when people move...when their weight or how often they imagine their futures and in which way they imagine future.

00:11:01: So taken together these instances showed me that brokerage is not just an economic activity but a social world on its own.

00:11:09: So what you were just describing, the cultural and social embeddedness of brokerage in their everyday lives.

00:11:16: And how it structures the imaginaries of what mobility looks like for migrants is a very strong an important argument that you made in your book because here You're trying to address The world of migration brokerage from market lens.

00:11:32: as an economic sociology yourself What do think this market lenses adding on current explanations of migration brokerage that we have in the literature.

00:11:44: Yeah, I think for that we need to first understand what are the dominant ways in which Migration Brokerage is looked at in migration studies?

00:12:01: The first one is the migration industry literature, which has done an excellent job in drawing our attention to growing role of commercial actors.

00:12:09: Whether it's private security companies brokerage agencies whether its training institutes all kinds of commercial Actors.

00:12:15: but there's often an implicit assumption that the commercialization Of Migration Services as simply a natural outcome of neoliberalism and that s states retreat from certain traditional state functions.

00:12:28: private markets just inevitably emerge to fill that gap.

00:12:32: But what tends to receive less attention in this is why particular markets emerge in the first place?

00:12:39: Who's creating them and for what purpose, so... That was my guiding question here And that was a major limitation on this body of literature.

00:12:49: Another way looking at brokerage Is often looking at brokers as source of migrant precarity and exploitation.

00:12:58: Now this is an incredibly important perspective because exploitation is a very real aspect of migrants' experiences.

00:13:06: But if we begin from the assumption that brokers are inherently exploitative, It also makes us overlook the broader institutional conditions from which they emerge.

00:13:21: So that was another limitation of this body of literature, Which is unable to see the structural context which produces migrant brokers.

00:13:31: What I try do instead Is look at brokerage as an institutionally constructed and a politically contested market.

00:13:39: This shifted focus away From individual brokers To the market itself.

00:13:44: It allowed me to ask why governments choose to rely on private intermediaries, how licensing works.

00:13:51: How they get into international agreements that shape competition among recruitment agencies for example and why most importantly does brokerage become a central mechanism through which modern day labour migration is governed?

00:14:04: So...to answer your question Market in my book is not just a phenomena that I'm looking into, it's lens that i am attempting to fully exploit.

00:14:14: To understand how brokerage functions and contemporary migration landscape.

00:14:19: Thank you.

00:14:20: So, You really stress an important point there where you're saying that the migration brokerage market is a central governance mechanism where the state plays and important role?

00:14:30: And the states interests are part of institutionalization of the market.

00:14:34: so in the book you also argue this and you also traced how this unfolded historically from the nineteen seventies.

00:14:42: maybe could you walk us through That How The State Plays A Role In Shaping The Brokerage Market specifically for the state to do so.

00:14:52: The key argument that I make is that the Naples State doesn't simply regulate migration brokerage from outside, it has actively participated in creating and organizing the brokerage market itself.

00:15:05: To understand why this is the case, we first need to understand how states' attitude towards labour migration has shifted over time.

00:15:12: You mentioned specific decades and they are indeed super relevant if you look back in the nineteen seventies.

00:15:19: into the nineteen nineties The state's approach of labour migration was actually quite cautious And very restrictive.

00:15:26: It was almost afraid of labour migrations.

00:15:30: it saw as a social problem.

00:15:32: So debates around brain drain was there in policy interventions.

00:15:37: People were talking about how it makes certain parts of the population more vulnerable than they already are, including women and children.

00:15:44: so a lot of restrictions were placed on their migration for instance.

00:15:49: And while brokers did exist at this point They existed completely outside of the purviews state.

00:15:55: So It's an informal labour market.

00:15:57: At that time There is no comprehensive institutional framework governing

00:16:02: them.

00:16:03: So, one can say that the state's involvement in migration at this stage was very limited.

00:16:09: But that began to really shift and change in the nineteen nineties especially towards two thousands.

00:16:16: As labour migration expanded it became increasingly clear That remittances were making enormous contributions To GDP And to poverty reductions.

00:16:25: they could actually calculate that.

00:16:27: so Migration shifted from being viewed as a social concern to being seen as a big opportunity, As the key development strategy even.

00:16:36: So once that happened The state's objective was no longer simply To regulate migration but Was to facilitate and even expand it.

00:16:44: This is where Brokridge becomes central.

00:16:47: Rather than building A large public mechanism To facilitate labour migration The State chose to govern Migration through a regulated set of private intermediaries.

00:16:58: It formalized recruitment agencies through licensing, promoted overseas employment facilitated even loans for potential migrants.

00:17:07: Negotiated bilateral agreements with different countries and even commissioned research with the Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu to do different kinds of research on the potential labour market potentials of Nepalese migrants and even anticipate demand for future.

00:17:22: In other words state didn't retreat into face privatisation.

00:17:25: it actually actively built institutional infrastructure that allowed the market to flourish.

00:17:31: What I found particularly interesting is that, The state organized this market in quite specific ways.

00:17:37: It decided which actors would be considered legitimate and which not.

00:17:42: So of course their recruitment agencies were licensed so they were considered the legitimate actors through which you can migrate.

00:17:48: On other hand, the freelance brokers who actually connected migrants to their recruitment agency.

00:17:53: talking about local agents they and the informal branches of recruitment agencies known as shakhas.

00:17:59: They were completely banned, now considered illegitimate.

00:18:03: So despite playing a crucial role in how recruitment actually functions The state made it quite clear who is an actor which was legitimate or not.

00:18:13: Apart from this ,the State also shaped market through a range of regulatory tools.

00:18:17: It introduced licensing requirements rewards & sanctions for agencies.

00:18:22: There's actually ranking of recruitment agencies in Nepal based on the number of migrants they send abroad.

00:18:28: So quantity becomes a central criteria by which you are positively rewarded, there are legal caps or recruitment fees so that they can't just charge any kind of fee.

00:18:39: There are restrictions and incentives around particular migration call doors policies influence by both the volume and destination of labour migration.

00:18:48: So these interventions, this structured competition within industry has also shaped what counted as legitimate brokerage practices.

00:18:56: That was a very interesting point that you just mentioned about how the state organizes the legitimacy of different actors.

00:19:05: And like you said, The use of local agents is considered now illegitimate and technically illegal.

00:19:12: but in the book You also mention it's still very common and accepted as Just How Things Get Done To borrow mindset term called this Legitimate Illegality.

00:19:23: So could maybe elaborate on further this work?

00:19:26: What holds the system of almost legal practices together and what does it take to cross a line into something that market itself considers unacceptable.

00:19:36: Yeah,

00:19:37: yeah!

00:19:37: That's an interesting question because we often assume political legitimacy should be enough for a market function but its actually social legitimacy which counts more on the sustained existence legal markets from time to time as well.

00:19:57: So let me illustrate this with an example, to really understand what legitimate illegality in the context means.

00:20:04: Imagine you are a prospective migrant worker in Nepal and applying for all kinds of documents including labour permits.

00:20:15: When you do that, You often encounter information booths run by NGOs and civil society actors known as MRCs or Migrant Resource Centers.

00:20:25: And in these MRCs your are often reminded That the legally permitted recruitment fee is actually Rs.

00:20:31: Ten Thousand Nepali.

00:20:33: So you know the law.

00:20:35: Everybody knows The Law.

00:20:36: But then Your Recruitment Broker tells you Securing the job will cost to you fourteen times that amount You pay anyway.

00:20:44: The broker asks you to pay in cash so there is no record of the transaction and your agreeing.

00:20:50: Even though that leaves with absolutely no evidence.

00:20:53: if something goes wrong later, You can't really penalize particular actor concern which local agent.

00:20:59: The obvious question why would someone knowingly do this?

00:21:03: At one level The answer is quite straightforward.

00:21:06: People are often under enormous economic and social pressure to go abroad for work, so that's a simple answer.

00:21:12: the potential earnings from abroad often outweighed their risks of paying such big fee.

00:21:19: but sociologically what interesting.

00:21:22: it isn't simply an individual decision here.

00:21:24: its about conformity with norms in market.

00:21:28: These practices are so widespread that they become understood as how migration happens, So you don't really question them and You know that refusing to participate may actually reduce your chances of going abroad.

00:21:40: It's a very practical decision.

00:21:41: what I found Very interesting in this kind of illigality is that different actors have different interpretations Of it and the tolerate it and rationalize it in different ways.

00:21:52: So what's particularly fascinating is the way these practices are morally justified.

00:21:57: Brokers and officials often invoke what anthropologists called emic categories, they often invoke the idea of a poor migrant or an inefficient state.

00:22:07: They often use these terms in their conversation to justify this kind of illegal actions.

00:22:12: The argument that we make Without informal payments, personal networks or local procurs many migrants especially those who are coming from rural areas with very little education would never be able to navigate the bureaucracy.

00:22:26: Or secure overseas jobs abroad.

00:22:28: so they often give examples.

00:22:29: like you know this is particular migrant ,this his name and he had absolutely nothing.

00:22:35: but I have been involved in this person for last ten years.

00:22:39: now has a house of its own His children are studying in a private school and they're doing quite well.

00:22:44: So these kind of justifications often provided because there's very little trust at the government, There is general disillusionment with democracy itself.

00:22:53: so people don't really trust these parties' power In this context for agile political contexts.

00:23:00: They think it their intervention as brokers which makes possible to secure jobs abroad and survive And in country with rampant unemployment.

00:23:10: So it's interesting that they justify practices, there actually puts financial burden on migrants with the logic that ultimately serves migrant interests and migrants.

00:23:21: And local bureaucrats often tolerate such practices as well.

00:23:24: but doesn't mean no moral boundaries at all.

00:23:28: The market actually distinguishes between practices that are considered acceptable.

00:23:34: So that line is generally drawn when the migrants' health or well-being are endangered.

00:23:40: For example, there's smuggling involved and trafficking involved Or the migrant worker has put in a hazardous workplace There's contract substitution and it's sent somewhere completely unknown.

00:23:50: These kind of practices still are condemned so its not like anything goes.

00:23:55: Those practices attract legal sanctions, they do attract public criticism and disapproval from the industry actors itself.

00:24:02: So there are very clear moral boundaries that are drawn.

00:24:05: so I think the key takeaway here is that legality and legitimacy don't always go hand-in-hand.

00:24:11: something can be legal but doesn't have to be legitimate And vice versa!

00:24:15: That case presented in this book provides a very interesting example of it.

00:24:21: Well, you were just saying really illuminates how agents are placed in this position where they have to navigate the tension between legality and illegality.

00:24:31: And sometimes illegality doesn't necessarily mean illegitimate.

00:24:35: There's another tension that you also mentioned a tension between self interest and trust which is also center too This understanding of the moral positioning of migration agents and it's also very closely related to the term Da Lao that you mentioned.

00:24:53: And there is a very interesting story I find in this book about an agent named Su Jaan, his family would borrow money from him but then they refused for his niece's wedding because it was considered dirty money.

00:25:07: So what do moments like these tell you about the lives and positions of migration agents?

00:25:13: Thanks for this question, I think it points to two very relevant things.

00:25:16: first-the cultural specificity of brokerage in Nepal or South Asian context in general Because the word Dalal is used in other South Asian countries as well.

00:25:26: The second would be a question on social and moral legitimacy of markets itself which we touched upon at last.

00:25:33: So at its most basic level of Dalal is an intermediary, somebody who transfers information from one party to another sometimes even resources.

00:25:41: But in everyday usage and parlance it actually carries a more negative connotation that is not quite common in other cultural contexts.

00:25:50: so dalal is someone then profits form the vulnerability of others almost like a pimp selling vulnerable person to another party.

00:26:00: So this negative connotation is important because it shows that brokerage has never simply an economic activity, its also a moral and social position as a broker.

00:26:08: The story of Sujan you bring up captures very well.

00:26:12: so his family is willing to borrow money from him but they are unwilling.

00:26:26: This can be his niece's wedding, but it could also be some religious events or functions.

00:26:32: The money was seen as dirty money and this tells us something quite profound.

00:26:37: so even when brokers are legally recognized financially successful they're able to demonstrate their success through large offices in businesses.

00:26:46: They still remain vulnerable to stigma.

00:26:49: In fact the stigma becomes powerful that when market order becomes unstable the stigma becomes even more pronounced.

00:26:58: So when everything is fine, The migrant worker got his job quite peacefully.

00:27:03: There's no tension No dissent No problem.

00:27:06: When Everything Is Alright Illegality is tolerated Quite well As we talked about.

00:27:12: But when the order in the market is disrupted Then the trust That is very carefully built between the broker and the migrant worker And that is disrupted.

00:27:22: When that breaks down, the figure of the Dalal becomes even more powerful and looms larger than life.

00:27:27: So what I find so fascinating in this is that the stigma does not just attach to the person that the broker is but it also attaches itself with money that a broker's making.

00:27:37: The idea of dirty money shows that moral judgement has actually passed on something material, something profane as cash notes which is quite revealing.

00:27:49: From the perspective of market sociology, on the other hand these stories also tell us that market making never a fully finished project.

00:27:58: it's always evolving and needs to be negotiated and contested.

00:28:03: brokers are constantly negotiating their identity its not one time task for them.

00:28:08: Their legitimacy, their place in society has to be negotiated from time-to-time.

00:28:13: The market order actually depends on this very delicate form of trust that is forged between the broker, the society and migrant worker.

00:28:21: This story just shows it quite well.

00:28:23: It also shows how easily such a trust can be fractured.

00:28:26: So

00:28:28: you were just saying that when there are times of instability, When the order of market is disrupted then trust breaks down and stigma intensifies.

00:28:39: Can you give us an example of such instance?

00:28:42: where Trust Breaks Down may be between migration broker and migrant?

00:28:50: Yeah, of course.

00:28:50: So the book talks about at least a handful of examples where you see that breakdown of trust.

00:28:55: quite well so one of them for example would be when migrant worker thought everything is working well and everything in his favor.

00:29:07: but then the migrant worker went abroad to Saudi Arabia.

00:29:11: he found out this job was promised not given it's common case contract substitution.

00:29:17: It happens, unfortunately a lot of cases.

00:29:20: He finds out that the job he was promised is that of waiter but when he was sent abroad... ...he had to work in pest control which has nothing do with waiting at restaurant.

00:29:30: So In such context and over next few days arriving in Saudi Arabia he realized this work isn't easy.

00:29:39: it's hazardous often contact with hazard chemicals & no training whatsoever.

00:29:44: so his family.

00:29:46: because his migrant worker informs the family that this is a situation.

00:29:49: His family actually tracks down their local agent and extra legally beats them, really like viciously attack them.

00:29:58: This tells us A they don't have trust in the legal mechanism That will eventually get justice.

00:30:03: B it shows the fragile trust which was formed between the local broker who's often representing community to them.

00:30:10: It has cast based relationships where.

00:30:13: so this fragile trust is broken.

00:30:15: And the consequences for that broker, of course was no more migrant worker went to him in the future.

00:30:22: Because people often came to know this person as somebody who sends people on wrong destinations and even if it was an employer or a fault Even when contract substitution is done by the employer and representative It's interesting how the entire blame went into local agent because he was the face of the entire migration process for the migrant worker.

00:30:45: Another more recent example would be that vandalizing incidents where several migrant workers vandalize recruitment agencies in Manpower Bazaar, Because they really thought there's nothing else it can do.

00:30:56: so They have absolutely no authority over these recruitment agencies.

00:31:00: if they go on with court proceedings If they file a legal charge against them There is hardly any proof.

00:31:05: like we talked about the recruitment fee When it's paid in cash, what proof do you have?

00:31:11: So the only means they have of seeking some sort justice is often extra legally and that somehow ends up violent confrontations.

00:31:20: That would be an example but of course book sites a few more.

00:31:24: That's very important to note the ambiguous positioning of migration brokers.

00:31:30: And I think this ambiguous positioning is definitely much more tested in times of crises, so you mentioned that your field work coincided with COVID-IX and it was a big period of disruption in the migration brokerage market.

00:31:46: to you, what did that period of disruption reveal about the market?

00:31:50: That You might have not seen in more stable times and how it affect you.

00:31:55: The way that you were able to conduct a research itself.

00:31:59: Yeah COVID completely changed my research on methodology but in retrospect I think It worked out for best.

00:32:07: My initial research design was compare different migration contexts.

00:32:11: And I had flights booked to Japan and Malaysia, secured a fellowship in japan.

00:32:16: then in twenty-twenty just as i had thankfully completed the first leg of my fieldwork at nipal travel bans were announced and my immediate reaction was oh no!

00:32:25: My research is ruined.

00:32:26: but The disruption unexpectedly gave me A fascinating entry point into understanding what happens To market.

00:32:33: that depends almost entirely on somebody else's mobility.

00:32:37: At That Point The media was full of stories about migrants being stranded and migration flows coming to a standstill.

00:32:43: But what is less visible, this meant for the brokers whose livelihood depended completely on migration.

00:32:51: Suddenly they had no certainty whether their business would survive or not And if there were any work in the foreseeable future.

00:33:00: That intense uncertainty revealed how vulnerable market itself And because mobility had essentially stopped, I was able to observe practices that might otherwise have remained less visible.

00:33:13: For example this was also the time in order which is... Order is an interesting thing.

00:33:18: when everything's working fine you don't really see it.

00:33:21: but then things are not working fine.

00:33:23: That's where we can see breaks and ruptures.

00:33:26: There were instances that were quite revealing to me in the pandemic time.

00:33:30: As we discussed previously, a lot of activities in the brokerage market tries to stay within the moral limits of legitimate legality or what they call almost legal practices right?

00:33:42: So during COVID also try to abide by it.

00:33:46: but if you could see as uncertainty progressed months passed and didn't really know whether their work can continue is before We could really see the market actors beginning to question that kind of an established practice and begin experimenting with different forms of illegality.

00:34:05: Examples included sending migrants through tourist visa instead of proper work visas or sending migrants though a third country such as India, even taking more drastic steps like recruiting completely without informing government.

00:34:21: A very visible case of this was the Qatar Police recruitment.

00:34:25: So for the Qatar police force, they wanted Nepalese workers.

00:34:30: This was also around the time FIFA World Cup.

00:34:32: so they wanted a lot of security personnel.

00:34:35: But there was a travel ban.

00:34:37: so Nepal didn't really allow any proper recruitment and placement around this time.

00:34:41: but we started seeing these disruptive practices in the market.

00:34:45: that recruitment was happening for the Qatar police and migrants were being collected to use their

00:34:50: words.

00:34:51: So it showed me, when such extreme uncertainties imposed externally a market can start pushing its moral and social boundaries.

00:35:03: It started experimenting with practice which might have been previously considered unacceptable.

00:35:08: And second thing is how dynamic this entire process is.

00:35:11: It also showed me that market respond to the kind of disruption from within.

00:35:16: So the market actors themselves were challenging this kind of illegality, illegitimate illegality.

00:35:21: Market actors began policing the boundaries for example of the market reporting violations and they were trying to restore stability as well.

00:35:29: several cases of whistleblowing coming up.

00:35:32: for examples brokers tried to eliminate their competitors by saying okay This is happening.

00:35:36: The state should intervene in secretly revealing names of their competitors to make sure that the stability as they have known before is restored.

00:35:46: So in that sense, a pandemic was not just disruption on market.

00:35:50: it became kind of stress test for entire market.

00:35:53: It revealed both the fragility and order what the market actors are willing do And what markets are willing accept & challenge.

00:36:03: Apparently, the COVID-in hit all of us really hard and you mentioned having to change your entire plans.

00:36:10: But then eventually that gave me a very interesting vantage point To look at market in new lens when vulnerability is revealed.

00:36:20: And I think this brings up question about positionality.

00:36:24: for as researcher What was it like being there in field observing interactions?

00:36:31: that was going on, how did your position as a researcher influence you?

00:36:35: And also an Indian woman yourself.

00:36:39: How does that influence your course of research at all?

00:36:43: Yeah!

00:36:43: That is quite interesting thing about researchers

00:36:46: right?!

00:36:46: We don't just research like socially isolated individuals but we bring with us the entire positionality... ...we carry that baggage to our field and so do I And attached both positive aspects to it and some negative as well.

00:37:01: So my positionality, As somebody who sort of looked Nepali almost That gave me interesting entry points.

00:37:10: I didn't realise that before i actually went into the field I was told that I look like a Nivari woman which is particular community in Nepal.

00:37:17: so when they saw me They didnt see a foreigner But My poor skills in Nepali language did Of course give me some problems from time to time.

00:37:28: But most of the respondents were quite accommodating with that, they were quiet nice.

00:37:34: Gender is quite interesting in a way it works.

00:37:37: so I did get some opportunities people more or less polite for being women and I got romantic requests as well!

00:37:48: That was also unexpected Especially when I'm interviewing some respondents in a cafe, the setting is informal.

00:37:55: There can be a miscommunication of intentions.

00:37:57: so i had to always say-I am here for this reason and we are not going to meet again probably.

00:38:03: but i had some follow up requests And also have business proposal!

00:38:08: I was told by broker that actually supply workers from Germany and we can collaborate on facilitating migration of bakery workers.

00:38:19: So very interesting vignettes from the field.

00:38:22: but as such my positionality opened some doors for me, but closed others.

00:38:28: language was a barrier.

00:38:29: gender did prevent me from accessing certain landscapes or rooms.

00:38:34: so for example We talked about Sujan in the confrontational episode that Sujan is part of the broker where migrant worker just came exploring with his anger and frustration, that particular scene could have been very different if I wasn't sitting in the room for example.

00:38:50: And i would've been able to observe the dynamics unfolded a way differently If I was man but because I'm woman look at certain ways had a particular demeanor I was interviewing.

00:39:02: that includes certain power dynamic.

00:39:04: The broker pointed my direction said we have somebody this room.

00:39:09: can you postpone conversation later?

00:39:11: So the angry migrant retreated, hearing this.

00:39:15: And these could have ended up in a completely different ethnographic observation.

00:39:19: but my positionality as woman forced them to make confrontation somehow civil and reduce agitation.

00:39:28: so it did open some possibilities also close

00:39:32: others.

00:39:33: Thank you for that insight.

00:39:34: I think now we can maybe zoom out talk about the key takeaways that you want to convey through this book.

00:39:42: Looking back, what do think are the most important takeaways on the front of empirical case of Nepal and also conceptually?

00:39:51: And how do these change about the way we think about migration brokerage more broadly?

00:39:57: Yeah starting with Nepal One of the key lessons is about the dilemma that many migrant exporting countries face.

00:40:05: These are countries that are highly dependent on remittances, Nepal can become trapped in this remittance-dependent development agenda quite visible and there are resistances, this mobilization from the field posing that kind of a policy agenda as well.

00:40:21: But it's not to take away from book point here.

00:40:24: what I'm making is at state clearly wants to benefit from immigration.

00:40:27: It clearly want to commercialize mobility in exchange for labor power with citizens right?

00:40:34: At same time has an obligation to protect those citizens from the extremities of cross-border labor market, from the extramities of migration itself.

00:40:45: That creates a fundamental tension.

00:40:48: The state is simultaneously trying to promote migration and regulate it To benefit from the market while also protecting its people from their risks.

00:40:57: So the Naples case shows that such tensions inform migration policies And It's very important we look at them closely.

00:41:06: So, one example of this constant tension is the recent renaming of a government department called Foreign Employment Board.

00:41:14: till recently for an employment board was known as foreign employment promotion board FEPB.

00:41:19: but because of mass mobilizations media reports about the kind of vulnerabilities Nepalese migrants face abroad.

00:41:27: Nepal government didn't want to be associated with promotion of such labour migration, so it removed the word promotion from the department itself.

00:41:34: These are very small ways in which we can observe such fundamental tension that informs state policies.

00:41:41: but what's also important here is to recognise there're some well-intended But they can have some unintended consequences for migrant workers.

00:41:52: And the book really gets into a deep dive to understand such policies and the unintended consequences of them, what kind new forms or vulnerabilities could be created from such policies as well?

00:42:03: So that would one.

00:42:05: The broader conceptual takeaway comes form looking at migration.

00:42:09: brokerage is market.

00:42:11: Markets are so pervasive in our lives we often treat it like something just exists.

00:42:18: We see buyers, we sellers and brokers in transactions.

00:42:22: And we just assume the market is naturally there.

00:42:24: but the market lens asks a different set of questions how this market created?

00:42:30: Who created it?

00:42:31: what are purposes for it?

00:42:33: How its identity established when that identity challenged.

00:42:39: What are those moments which reveal tensions within it?

00:42:43: How expectations among market actors stabilized?

00:42:47: How is social acceptance for these practices as we talked about produced or contested?

00:42:52: So, these are the important questions that were able to ask with lens of market.

00:42:57: This perspective changes entirely.

00:43:00: how understand migration brokers?

00:43:02: so rather than seeing them simply a random assortment individuals via able see brokerage institution emerges and develops within very particular historical institutional context.

00:43:15: The market lens is very relevant in how we understand not only what brokers do, but also the social and political conditions that enable what they do.

00:43:24: So the background – That becomes super important here!

00:43:27: It helps us see how a market is built How boundaries are negotiated What kind of legitimacy there?

00:43:34: And how it's produced?

00:43:39: So

00:43:41: this tension between commodifying labor and decommodifying labor basically, between promoting migration.

00:43:50: And protection of the migrants as you said provided some benefits but then also new forms of vulnerabilities.

00:43:58: in that case than we can say.

00:44:01: ultimately migrant precarity Can be seen a systemic outcome.

00:44:06: so maybe We can draw the lens into something bit more practical and talk about policies or migrant welfare.

00:44:15: In terms of practical implications, does the book argument have any implications on how we should be governing migration differently?

00:44:24: Yes absolutely.

00:44:25: I think one of the most important practical implications is that if precarities indeed produce systemically We cannot address it simply by identifying and punishing individual agents.

00:44:38: So that does not mean that agents should be held accountable for their actions, of course they shouldn't.

00:44:43: But focusing only on individual bad actors can obscure the broader structures and create conditions under which exploitation becomes possible right?

00:44:54: For example migration agents operate within a system shaped by bilateral agreements state regulations international organizations The nature of the demand itself, they employ a foreign labour market dynamics.

00:45:07: Power asymmetries and information asymmetry.

00:45:10: also more importantly perhaps economic pressures that migrant faces compels them to comply with these standards.

00:45:17: so lot factors enable work of brokers.

00:45:21: if you want reduce migrant precarity we need understand how all elements interact and not just blame the most visible part of this transaction, which is brokers.

00:45:32: This also means that regulation needs to move beyond simply trying to eliminate brokerers.

00:45:38: so there's recent trend of banning brokers from certain migration corridors or completely attempting to eliminate their existence.

00:45:46: but history shows we can't really do without forcing them to exist in illegal ways.

00:45:52: So they will exist eventually, either in legislative shadows or with political legitimacy.

00:45:58: The question that we need to ask is what the kind of work are doing?

00:46:02: What does intermediation entail and functions do for migrant workers?

00:46:07: Why do migrants trust these actors instead state authorities?

00:46:11: So the question that we need to ask is not how do we get rid of the agent, but what function is the agent performing and How can those functions be made safer more transparent?

00:46:21: And more accountable.

00:46:23: The policy makers need To us.

00:46:25: our recruitment fees are structured for example who bears the cost and the risk Of migration and how contracts enforced in this kind of dynamic.

00:46:34: so it also means paying attention to incentives created by the regulation itself.

00:46:38: As we discussed, regulations sometimes can have unintended consequences for the migrant worker as the book shows.

00:46:45: so it's also to understand what kind of incentive is a regulation creating?

00:46:49: So it needs a bit more nuanced framework The broader lesson that we are carrying here is that migrant welfare cannot be separated from the organization of migration itself.

00:47:00: We need to understand both them together To actually better govern labor migration.

00:47:05: Thank you.

00:47:06: That's a very illuminating note to end on.

00:47:09: Maybe now we can look a bit into the future.

00:47:11: In the book, you touch upon other types of intermediaries beyond commercial profit-seeking agents like you mentioned migrant networks or state itself acting as broker but these were not focused on books.

00:47:24: is that direction planning to build and what does your current research looks?

00:47:31: Yeah definitely there's very much direction I'm building in my current research.

00:47:35: so currently postdoc researcher group that focuses entirely on cross-border labour markets.

00:47:41: So as a group we are asking what enables cross border labour market, within this I am trying to understand the role of contracts and organizational tools in producing such markets.

00:47:55: so But one of the things that made it clear to me was that migration corridors are almost never organized by a single type of intermediary, right?

00:48:07: Commercial brokers are only one part of much broader social infrastructure for migration.

00:48:12: My current project looks comparatively at different kinds of intermediaries including brokers, social networks and state itself as an intermediary.

00:48:23: These actors may all help facilitate migration but they have very different interests different organizational forms, resources and relationships with migrants.

00:48:33: When we compare them how does contract look like when different intermediary gets involved?

00:48:40: when different intermediary enforces that contract.

00:48:46: So sometimes, When we compare these two intermediaries they might be cooperating with one another Sometimes competing or even substituting for

00:48:56: each other.

00:48:57: A migrant can rely on social network information For example, on a commercial broker perhaps for recruitment and documentation And depends still on the state for legitimacy and formal authority channels of migration for different purposes and their access to these channels can also be restricted based on the positionality of the migrant itself.

00:49:21: Perhaps, gender-the caste-the financial position of the migrants prevents them from accessing certain channels so that channel itself becomes important in understanding how contracts are made.

00:49:32: So The current project then takes off an extents argument made by looking at different kinds of intermediation migration and cross-border labor

00:49:43: markets.

00:49:45: Yeah, thank you very much!

00:49:46: That's a very important part that your research is trying to delve more into and I really look forward maybe hearing more discussing um...your future research progress.

00:49:58: so i think today's conversation really captures the spirit of the book and Thank You So Much for walking us through The Book.

00:50:06: it's been a generally insightful conversation.

00:50:09: Thank you so much.

00:50:11: It's been a pleasure to discuss the book with you and thanks a lot Lana for helping us put it together.

00:50:16: We end this episode with quote picked by our host, Mai Thi Nguyen The migration agent is not free agent nor fully an instrument of state or society.

00:50:29: The figure of the migration agent is not a static identity, but a fluid social position that individuals groups and entities can occupy based on their role in their interest within the migrational process.

00:50:44: They represent a Social Vector where both opportunity & exploitation co-exist!

00:50:58: opportunity and risk, and is contingent on shifting social and economic contexts rather than any fixed essence.

00:51:07: Page X Preface Agents of Migration.

00:51:11: Institutional Embeddedness Of Labor.

00:51:13: Brukridge

00:51:15: in Nepal

00:51:15: by Sandhya Ayes.

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